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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
OLU E X VI APRIL, 1942 NUMBER 2
THE VALIDITY AND UTILITY OF SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
T IS usually interesting to delve into a province of the law
which contains conflicting and inconsistent decisions.
Such study is profitable in that it affords an opportunity to
look deeper into the true meaning of the law and the prac-
tical psychology of the courts. Our province is Domestic
Relations.
Narrowing our field of observation for purposes of con-
venience, we focus upon separation agreements. This is
quite a refinement since by studying separation agreements
we exclude agreements between H and W executed before
the marriage (antenuptial agreements), those made after
the marriage but not involving a separation of the parties
(postnuptial agreements),' and all types of property settle-
ments. As a further convenience we -shall limit our inves-
tigation to New York law. This last limitation will aid all
of us regardless of the State jurisdiction we wish to analyze.
The reason is that if we succeed in isolating our "germ"l in
one environment, it is relatively simple to watch and study
it in other locations.
FACTORS WHICH AFFECT SEPARATON AGRE MENTS
A. Initial Validity at Early Law
No less than four factors militated against the validity
of separation agreements at early common law. One was the
I Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N. Y. 337, 18 N. E. (2d) 521 (1939).
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unity of man and wife. Since husband and wife were one
person, and since a man can not contract with himself, ergo,
H could not contract with W. 2 The second was the settled
policy against agreements looking toward the dissolution of
the marriage relationship. The third was the fact that in
England only the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction to
interfere in matters affecting the marital res. Thus the in-
clusion of an a fortiori is impelled when we come to say that
the parties themselves could not alter the marriage relation-
ship. The final factor trampling the belabored separation
contract was its indivisibility. That is, such contracts con-
tain many clauses only one of which is the promise to live
separate and apart. It is precisely this covenant which the
above-enumerated factors struck. And since the separation
clause is the heart of the contract, the entire contract fell
with it.
How were these obstacles overcome?
There are three means through which the law grows:
legislation, fictions, and equity. In our case it was not long
before the paternal hand of equity reached out to help avoid
manifest injustice. The injustice would arise when W, un-
provided for when H ceased his payments under his con-
tract, sued upon the contract, and was summarily thrown
out. Since the contract was no good no suit could be main-
tained thereon. The equities of the case were with the wife,
and courts of equity came to her aid. If the contract were
made through the intervention of a trustee, the unity argu-
ment failed; 3 if the contract were made after the parties
had already separated, such separation was a fait accompli,
and there no longer was any public policy to conserve; 4
the American courts vi et aris construed the contracts as
divisible; 5 in England the courts of equity slowly took over
the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and in this coun-
try there never was a separate ecclesiastical court. With
these conditions and reasoning it was not surprising to no-
2 See 1 BLAcKSTOxE, COMMENTARIES 468; Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N. Y.
411, 22 N. E. 1029 (1889).
3 Northrop v. Barnum, 15 Wend. 167 (N. Y. 1836).
4 Besant v. Wood, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 605 (1879).
5 Rough v. Rough, 195 S. W. 501 (Mo. App. 1917).
1942 ] SEPARATION AGREEMENTS IN N. Y. 187
tice courts of equity in this country allowing parties to affect
their marriage to the extent of a separation agreement.0
The historical steps involved in the granting of recogni-
tion to separation agreements were a bit different in New
York. In this state at first there had to be a trustee, the
parties had to be apart at the date of execution, a cause for
divorce had to exist, and the agreement had to merit equitable
relief in all respects.7  If all these conditions were satisfied,
then did courts of equity grant relief to the wife suing upon
the contract.
In 1896 the first Domestic Relations Law of New York
was passed. Section 21 of this law sanctioned contracts be-
tween H and W. Thus a trustee was not necessary, and
courts of law recognized separation agreements. Courts of
law also held that if at the date of execution the parties were
apart, or separated immediately thereafter, the agreement
would be valid even though no grounds for divorce existed'
The introduction of the separation agreement into the
law courts in 1896 marked a significant change in its treat-
ment and validity. Before enforcing a contract of any na-
ture equity will subject it to a more stringent scrutiny than
will a court of law. It must be remembered that the doc-
trine that fraud, duress, and coercion might overturn an
otherwise valid contract, originated in equity and was later
adopted by the law courts. In the case of separation agree-
ments equity went further in requiring equitable circum-
stances as a condition precedent to relief. Law courts took
over this type of scrutiny,9 but with a difference. When
equity enforced the agreement, it did so to avoid injustice.
That is, the contract was void unless a strong showing of
equitable circumstances could be made. Sanctioned by the
6Westmeath v. Westmeath, 1 Dow & Cl. 519 H. L. (1831); Carson v.
Murray, 3 Paige 483, 500 (N. Y. Ch. 1832).
7 Clark v. Fosdick, 118 N. Y. 7, 22 N. E. 1111 (1886).
8 Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1908) ; Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 193 App. Div. 784, 184 N. Y. Supp. 464 (1st Dep't 1920).
9 Courts today say that H is in a position of trust and confidence, and must
acquit himself uberrima fide. Ducas v. Guggenheimer, 90 Misc. 191, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 591 (1915), aff'd, 173 App. Div. 884, 157 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1st Dep't
1916); cf. In re Smith's Estate, 243 App. Div. 348, 276 N. Y. Supp. 646
(1932). But see In re McGlone's Will, 258 App. Div. 596, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
316 (2d Dep't 1940) for modern trend for only allowing the presumption of
fraud after some slight evidence is introduced.
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law, these agreements were valid unless inequitable circum-
stances were shown. In other words, there is here a differ-
ence in the mental resistance which the court directed at the
validity of separation agreements.
In Afflec1 v. Affleck 10 the court held that if the parties
were apart right after the contract was entered into, there
would be no public policy to conserve, and the agreement
would be upheld. Here is an old equity case wherein a sub-
sequent event-the separation-affected initial validity. The
court in Sh1epard v. Shepard" said that if the consideration
was suitable and meritorious, equity "would have been in-
clined to assist it". Simmons v. MoEhwain 12 declares that
an equity court would uphold such transactions "when it is
necessary to prevent injustice". With an inclination as re-
vealed in the above quotations, the court very subtly allowed
itself to be swayed by events occurring after the execution
of the contract. The exact extent of this trend is difficult
to delineate since the Domestic Relations Law of 1896 fol-
lowed swiftly to cut off the cases in equity. Its chief im-
portance lies in the historical background it provides for the
modern treatment accorded separation agreements at law.
B. Public Policy
As stated above the basis of the law courts' jurisdiction
over separation agreements was Section 21 of the Domestic
Relations Law of 1896. In effect that provided that H and
W could contract with one another, but not to relieve H of
his duty of support, nor alter the marriage relationship.
Embodied in these last two exceptions is the codification of
the public policy attaching to these contracts. We shall con-
sider them separately.
As to whether or not the contract alters the marriage
relationship, the law is relatively simple. A mere separation
affects not at all the marriage since the parties remain man
and wife. Only a divorce will alter it. And so contracts
conditioned upon, or in aid of, a divorce are void.'3 This rule
10 64 How. Pr. 380 (N. Y. 1882).
217 Johns. Ch. 57, 61 (N. Y. 1823).
12 26 Barb. 419, 422 (N. Y. 1857).
13 Schley v. Andrews, 225 N. Y. 110, 121 N. E. 812 (1919); Train v.
Davidson, 20 App. Div. 577, 47 N. Y. Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1897).
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savors of collusion. Yet in New York the two are distinct.
Collusion is a good defense to divorce, and is defined as any
fabrication of evidence or imposition upon the courts.14 A
contract whereby the husband gives his wife money or valid
proof to prosecute a bona fide suit is not collusion. Yet the
agreement is against public policy. If on a construction
and interpretation of the contract it can be said it aids the
court in determining the relief to be granted after a judicial
divorce, or if it does not tend to favor divorce, then public
policy will not strike it.' 5
Contracts in aid of a judicial separation would seem to
be good since such separation does not affect the marriage tie.
No cases have been found on this point.' 6 Contracts requir-
ing W to abandon her right to an appeal of a divorce decree
are struck by the same considerations as are agreements in
aid of divorce.'7
Turning to agreements relieving H of his duty of sup-
port, we first consider the case of Pettit v. Pettit "I which
arose in 1887, prior to the Domestic Relations Law of 1896.
That case contained the dictuom that "* * * the considera-
tion for the husband's promise to support his wife is his
relief from liability for her support." If this is so, then all
separation agreements fly in the teeth of the statute provid-
ing that H and W can not contract to relieve the former of
his duty of support.' 9 Cases arising subsequently explained
away this embarrassing dictum by pointing out that an ade-
quate payment, far from relieving, fulfilled the duty of sup-
port. It was also declared that the statute was enacted to
enlarge the rights of married women, and thus to hold that
all separation contracts were declared illegal by statute
would be to take away rather than add to a married woman's
14 Rosenzweig v. Rosenzweig, 231 App. Div. 13, 246 N. Y. Supp. 231 (2d
Dep't 1930).
'5 Hammerstein v. Trust Co., 211 N. Y. 611, 105 N. E. 1085 (1914).
""But cf. Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 642, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889),
where a contract for an immediate separation made through the intervention of
a trustee was upheld.
27 N. Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 1938, p. 1459, col. 7.
18 107 N. Y. 677, 14 N. E. 500 (1887).
29 The Pettit case was forced to make the quoted dictum because it did not
wish to say that the promise to live separate and apart was the consideration
for H's promise to pay.
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rights.20 An inadequate provision for support will of course
have the effect of relieving H of his marital duty, and is
void.21
1. Concerning the Duty to Support-An Analysis
Since separation agreements do not relieve H of his duty
to support, what happens to this duty while the contract is
in effect? Does it continue? Is it in abeyance? Does it
vanish?
Following the leading case of Clark v. Fosdiok 22 the
authorities are one in stating that in the absence of an in-
tention to the contrary, a divorce does not terminate a sep-
aration agreement. Divorce terminates the duty to support.23
Since the duty to support does not carry the contract down
with it, the reasoning must be that the duty to support is
liquidated as of the date of the execution of the contract.24
"His obligation to support his wife is a continuing one,
so long as that relation exists, and he ought not to be per-
mitted to escape his responsibility for her support even
though he paid what he agreed to pay at the time the sep-
axation agreement was made", says Harding v. Harding at
page 722 of the Appellate Division report.2 5  Here then is
authority for the proposition that the duty to support is a
continuing one. The best way to reconcile these two views
is to say that the duty to support is in abeyance since
* * * the contract may * * * by the assent of the parties to it, be
terminated, and once this is done, then the marital obligation of the
husband to support his wife again comes into existence.26
It is submitted that this latter reasoning is correct. The
only fly in the ointment is that courts like that in Harding
v. Harding are constantly using language indicating that
the duty to support is a continuing one. In most cases such
2 0 Effray v. Effray, 110 App. Div. 545, 97 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dep't
1905).
21 Glusker v. Glusker, 108 Misc. 287, 177 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1919).
22 See note 7, supra.
23 See People v. Schenkel, 258 N. Y. 224, 179 N. E. 474, 475 (1932).
24 (1913) 13 COL. L. RE . 168; (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 608.
25 203 App. Div. 721, 197 N. Y. Supp. 78 (1922), affd, 236 N. Y. 514,
142 N. E. 264 (1923).28 Randolph v. Field, 165 App. Div. 279, 150 N. Y. Supp. 822 (1914).
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reasoning must invalidate a separation agreement after a
divorce.27  Since the language is always pure dicta, it is
wise to disregard it, and hope that its use will be dis-
continued.
We run into difficulty when, after there has been a
divorce, one of the parties desires to set the agreement aside.
Now there is nothing to spring up. Since divorce ended the
duty to support, once the agreement is removed, nothing re-
mains. Hamlin v. Hamlin wrestled with this problem. 28
The Hamlin case held that by virtue of the contract, the
court forebore awarding alimony, but that the agreement of
the parties was insufficient to deprive the court of the sweep-
ing, remedial powers vested in it by Sections 1155 and 1170
of the New York Civil Practice Act. The policy of the Act
was to grant courts continuing jurisdiction to modify ali-
mony relief, and like policy demanded that the courts exer-
cise this power in spite of the divorce and separation agree-
ment. This case shows that it is important for a court to
embody the separation agreement in its decree so that there
will be no question of the court's later power to make modi-
fications. In a more drastic way it would be better if the
rule were adopted that a divorce ipso facto terminates all
separation agreements. Then the court would have to make
alimony provisions which are more expedient and equitable
by virtue of the pertinent provisions of the Civil Practice
Act than a separation agreement.
Analyzing the above facts we see that though a divorce ter-
minates the marital res and thus destroys the basis for the
husband's duty of support, nonetheless there exists enough
of a vestige of this duty to enable a court of law to place the
former husband under a support decree. In the eyes of the
law, divorce does not terminate the duty to support.
C. Considerations of Present Validity
We have said that an adequate provision for W's sup-
27 See notes 19 and 24, supra.
25 224 App. Div. 168, 230 N. Y. Supp. 51 (4th Dep't 1928).
29 See Harding v. Harding, note 25, supra; Brown v. Brown, 122 Misc.
714, 203 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1924), redlg, 239 N. Y. 518, 147 N. E. 177 (1924) ;
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 230 App. Div. 483, 245 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1st Dep't
1930) ; Perrin v. Perrin, 140 Misc. 406, 250 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1931).
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port does not relieve H of his duty of support. This is a
simple statement with a complex explanation. The complex-
ities arise out of the word adequate. To begin with, since
adequacy relates to the question of relief from the duty of
support, it should be included in our discussion of public
policy. However, adequacy is more subtle than that classi-
fication. When a wife receives an inadequate sum for her
support, it is probable that there was some element of fraud,
mistake, or coercion involved or that such elements will be
alleged in the wife's cause of action.2 9 In other words ade-
quacy and inadequacy are intimately tied up with these other
factors affecting the validity of separation agreements, and
for purposes of convenience we shall discuss adequacy here
with those other factors. In effect, inadequacy is but an-
other species of overreaching since an inadequate provision
of support is invariably the result of a hard bargain driven
by H who is in a position of trust and confidence.
Adequacy is a slippery word. We must first find a defi-
nition, and then we must devise a test. Adequacy is an
equitable term whose legal counterpart is sufficiency. When
a law court speaks of adequacy it thus demonstrates that it
is dealing with a subject having an equitable past. By rea-
son of this past, courts today apply an equitable scrutiny
to separation agreements. Thus something less than fraud
or duress-coercion and overreaching-are enough to over-
turn the contract.30
A support provision is adequate when it is equal to the
husband's duty of support. The pertinent inquiry is now
as to how to test or measure this duty. First, the duty is
relative. That is, if the wife has means of her own and agrees
to use such means, then a small sum may be adequate. In
fact, if the wife is wealthy, no provision at all, or 1 may be
adequate.31 There are cases contra, holding that provisions
of 1 or nothing are void on their face.3 2 Such holdings are
erroneous in that they lose sight of the fact that the duty to
30 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lester, 239 App. Div. 422, 267 N. Y. Supp. 827
(2d Dep't 1933) ; Hamlin v. Hamlin, note 28, supra; T)ucas v. Guggenheimer,
note 9, sipra.
S1 In re Kiltz's Will, 125 Misc. 475, 211 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1925); Rosen-
blatt v. Rosenblatt, 209 App. Div. 373, 204 N. Y. Supp. 676 (3d Dep't 1924).32Dworkin v. Dworkin, 247 App. Div. 213, 286 N. Y. Supp. 982 (1st
Dep't 1936) ; Golden v. Golden, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 76 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1939).
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support is a relative term.33 From the trend of present-day
decisions it would appear that a contract wherein the wife
gave the husband a sum for support, would not be against
public policy. These cases go so far as to say that a wealthy
wife may be under a duty to support her husband.3 4  In the
light of these pronouncements, it is incorrect to declare that
a $1 or less provision for W by H is void at once. Rather,
the correct approach is that such provision is valid until it
is proven at a trial that in view of all the circumstances, it
did not measure up to the duty to support.35
From the foregoing it is apparent that a separation
agreement can not be attacked collaterally. Its validity can
only be impinged by a direct action in court, and not by affi-
davits as is the case on a motion.3 6
Where adequacy is in issue the financial condition of
W will be taken into account since it can fairly be said that
by signing the contract W agreed to use her funds to the ex-
tent of providing herself with the necessary support.3 7
D. The Effect of Events Subsequent to Ewecution
It is clear that the time for measuring the financial con-
dition of H is the date of execution of the contract.38 That
is, only inadequacy at the date of execution of the agreement
will render it void. However, there is language in the cases
which would indicate that inadequacy may later develop and
overturn the contract. Such language is always dicta and is
33 Vallee v. Vallee, 154 Misc. 620, 277 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1935) ; Hungerford
v. Hungerford, 161 N. Y. 550, 56 N. E. 117 (1900).
34 Hodson v. Stapleton, 248 App. Div. 529, 290 N. Y. Supp. 570 (4th
Dep't 1936); Picker v. Picker, unreported, N. Y., May 8, 1936, reprinted
LINEy, SEPARATIo AGRmENTS AND ANTE-NUPTrAL CONTRACrS (1937) 241.
35 It re Haistead's Estate, 168 Misc. 832, 6 N. Y. S. (2d), aff'd, 280 N. Y.691, 21 N. E. (2d) 199 (1938) ; In re Warren, 207 App. Div. 793, 202 N. Y.
Supp. 586 (4th Dep't 1924); see (1925) 25 CoL. L. Rlv. 934. If the contract
is too sweeping and purports to relieve H of the duty to support for all future
times and circumstances, then it may be void on its face. See Pignatelli v.
Pignatelli, 169 Misc. 534, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 10, 18 (1939).
36 In re Tierney's Estate, 148 Misc. 378, 266 N. Y. Supp. 51 (1933) ; see
Harding v.Harding, note 25, supra; Cain v. Cain, 188 App. Div. 780, 177 N. Y.
Supp. 178 (4th Dep't 1919).
7 In re Kiltz's Will, note 31, supra; see p. 192, supra.
8 Hungerford v. Hungerford, note 33, supra; Vallee v. Vallee, note 33,
supra.
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misleading. It is so misleading as to call for a detailed his-
tory of the erroneous dicta.
Winter v. Winter39 was a case involving a suit by a wife
on a separation contract. The defense was that the contract
was void as contravening Section 51 of the Domestic Rela-
tions Law. The court held that if the provision for support
was adequate, the contract was not void. In 84 N. E. at
page 386 it expounded:
If it should turn out that the provision for the support of the wife
was inadequate, and that she accepted it unadvisedly and impru-
dently, a court of equity has power to set it aside.
This quotation merely speaks of inadequacy at the date of
execution, yet it is easy to see how this slightly ambiguous
quotation, standing alone, might convey the impression that
subsequent events may affect the agreement.
Perrin v. Perrin 40 uses language similar to that above-
quoted. In this case also the court found a factor existing
at the date of execution which vitiated the contract. It was
a slim factor as can be seen from the facts. H, a dentist, was
ill, and could not work. The parties then executed a separa-
tion agreement wherein the wife of necessity accepted a small
provision for her support. Later H recovered and resumed
his lucrative practice. Here is a clear case where subsequent
events seem to be affecting the agreement. However, the
rule of law is that subsequent events can not overturn a con-
tract valid and adequate at the date of its execution.41 The
court squirmed out of the hole by relying on mistake exist-
ing at the date of execution. The mistake was as to the exact
state of H's health. The court said that both parties were
unaware of the exact nature of his illness, and that this
mistake was enough to enable them to set the agreement
aside. Remembering that very often a doctor does not know
39 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1908).
40Note 29, supra.
41 In Tirrell v. Tirrell, 232 N. Y. 224, 133 N. E. 569 (1929), the wife,
awarded a lump sum, sued to set it aside, alleging nervousness and inadequacy.
There was a specific finding of no fraud, and that W was attended and advised
by her own attorney. The Appellate Division found the contract fair and
equitable; the Court of Appeals found the lump sum equalled only one year's
income for H and thus inadequate when made.
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the exact nature of an illness, it seems the court went to great
lengths to remedy an inequitable situation.
Though the Perrin case voices the rule that subsequent
events can not affect an otherwise valid agreement, it dem-
onstrates that in fact the rule is not so significant as it
appears. It is not difficult to see the exact effect which the
subsequent events had on the court.42
Another example of a court setting aside an agreement
for other factors, and uttering surplus verbiage about sub-
sequent events is Hamlin v. Hamlin 43 which says that
On a proper showing equity will interfere for the protection of
the wife as changing circumstances may require, not limiting itself
to cases where fraud or overreaching may have entered into her
contract.
Under our previous discussion 44 we have decided that
while a separation agreement is in effect, the duty to sup-
port is in abeyance. Thus if the agreement is set aside for
any reason, the duty springs up again. Now that duty is
measured by the current financial condition of H.
Harding v. Harding 45 was a case wherein W sued to set
aside a separation contract, alleging fraud and inadequacy.
W sought to examine H before trial as to his financial con-
dition for many years up to the date of trial. H objected,
saying that the years after the date of the execution of the
contract were immaterial since it is the financial condition
of H at that time that is sufficient to test adequacy. The
Court of Appeals held that H could be examined before trial
on his finances for all years up to the date of trial. The
Harding case cited Tirrell v. Tirrell for the proposition that
changing events may affect the contract. The Tirrell case
never stood for such a doctrine. That case merely held that
the contract involved was bad since the support money was
inadequate at the time of the execution.46 The Harding case
was clearly influenced by some loose verbiage in the Tirrell
opinion.
42 For correct rule see note 41, supra; Cain v. Cain, note 36, supra; Hun-
gerford v. Hungerford, note 33, supra; Vallee v. Vallee, note 33, supra.
43 Note 28, supra.
44 See Sec. 1, Concerning the duty to support-An Analysis, p. 190, supra.
45 Note 25, supra.
46 Note 41, supra.
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Later cases have followed the Harding case.47 Limiting
these cases to their facts and holdings, all they mean is that
H can be examined as to his finances for all years up to the
date of trial. However, the language of these cases would
indicate that they go much broader-that in all cases sub-
sequent affluence of H will invalidate an otherwise valid
agreement. To wit:
Plaintiff still being defendant's wife and the obligation still resting
upon him by law to support her according to his circumstances in
life, has the right to know what his circumstances are, and should
not be limited to ascertaining his financial condition at the time the
contract was made.48
We have said that during the pendency of a separation
agreement the duty of support is in abeyance. 49  Also that
an agreement can not be set aside by affidavits on motions. 50
A hearing for an examination before trial is on motion, and
thus the contract must be deemed valid during such motion.
Therefore, since the agreement is still in effect on the motion
for an examination before trial, the duty to support is still
in abeyance and the only measure of adequacy is H's finan-
cial condition at the date of the execution of the contract.
It is therefore submitted that the Harding case and its fol-
lowers are wrong.
At the trial the agreement might be set aside, and then
W might sue for a separation, if such grounds exist, and ob-
tain alimony based on the current finances of H. Thus con-
ceivably, the finances of H up to the date of the trial might
be material. However, in the Harding case and the others
following it, there was no prayer for a separation, and since
in New York alimony is only obtainable in a separation or
divorce action, the current finances of H could never become
material. It is therefore error to allow an examination be-
fore trial of H for financial years up to the date of trial
where W has not a cause of action for separation or divorce.
Subsequent cases have seized upon the Harding case and
tried to make it stand for the broad proposition that subse-
4 7 Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, note 29, supra; Brown v. Brown, note 29, supra.4s Harding v. Harding, note 25, supra.
49 Note44, upra.
50 Cf. note 35, supra.
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quent events can influence an otherwise valid agreement.
Brooklyn Trust (o. v. Lester 51 contains the following:
The husband is not thereby relieved of his duty of support if
he had failed in the agreement to make ample provision for her,
or if his subsequent affluence makes the provision insuffcient.
(Italics added.)
For this the court cited the Harding case.
The above errors are either dicta or else involved in mo-
tions for examinations before trial. In an opinion of a court
rendered after a full trial, it was held that in an action to
set aside a separation agreement, subsequent affluence of H
will not be sufficient to set aside the agreement.52 This is
the correct rule.5 3 To adopt the contrary rule would be to
render separation agreements ineffective. The finances of H
must usually vary from time to time, and thus it would be
foolish and useless to go through the formality of making a
contract which can not last very long. Moreover, it has
never been questioned but that subsequent financial reverses
of H will not suffice to render void an otherwise valid agree-
ment.5
4
The Harding case and its followers remain on the books
to confuse the law. A reversal by the Court of Appeals is
sorely needed.
The rule that subsequent affluence of H will not avail
to invalidate a separation agreement has all the grace of
simplicity, but may work hardship. It is best to impose some
limit upon it. The best limit is the absolute impoverishment
of W. That is, even though a contract may have been fair
and equitable in all respects at the date of execution, if,
through ignorance or misfortune, W is reduced to absolute
poverty, then it is proper that H should provide for her. If
H does not, then the wife will become a public charge and
the State will have to support her. As between the State and
H it is the duty of H to bear the burden. Using this reason-
51 Note 30, supra.
52 Crowell v. Crowell, 135 Misc. 530, 238 N. Y. Supp. 44, aff'd, 229 App.
Div. 771, 242 N. Y. Supp. 811 (1st Dep't 1929).
53 Cain v. Cain, note 36, stpra; Brown v. Brown, note 29, supra (lower
court opinion).
54 Chamberlain v. Cuning, 99 App. Div. 561, 91 N. Y. Supp. 105, aff'd,
184 N. Y. 526, 76 N. E. 1091 f(1904).
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ing the trend of modern cases is toward recognizing extreme
poverty as a factor which will be sufficient to overturn an
otherwise valid agreement. 55
Legislation also has been aware of this problem. It has
dealt with it by setting up the Domestic Relations Court. 56
In this court W can secure an order for her support even
though there is a separation agreement outstanding. It
would seem wise to allow the same relief in the regular
courts. That is, allow complete poverty to overturn the
agreement and thus free W to get any relief to which she is
entitled.
Suppose H threatens to become a public charge. Should
this enable him to set the contract aside? Courts have said
that W may be under a duty to support H if H is destitute.57
Since H is destitute, the agreement means little because in
any event W can recover nothing from her spouse. How-
ever, the arrears do accumulate. This accumulation may be
enough to prevent H from afterward staging a business come-
back. Under the provisions of Section 17 of the Chandler
Act 58 these arrears would not be dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. If a married couple become public charges for three
years, and then the husband reestablishes himself, the hus-
55 Veeck v. Veeck, 215 App. Div. 705, 212 N. Y. Supp. 933 (lst Dep't
1927) ; Crowell v. Crowell, note 52, sapra; cf. Harding v. Harding, note 25,
supra.
56 The Domestic Relations Court was set up for the city of New York and
its jurisdiction is limited to that city. In other parts of the state the same
relief may be obtained through Code of Criminal Procedure § 899, subd. 1,
providing that persons who leave their wives or children in danger of becoming
public charges are disorderly persons. The punishment for this misdemeanor
is that the husband furnish a bond to the Overseer of the Poor for the support
of the charges. Otherwise H goes to jail. If the wife shows she is a public
charge, a separation agreement would not help H. The reason is that as
between H and the state, it is lor H to support W. Cf. GnLaFRT, N. Y. COD-
OF CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE (1939) § 899, subd. 1 and annotation.
By the Laws of 1933, c. 482, the Domestic Relations Court was set up to
assume jurisdiction over cases arising under the above subdivision in New
York City. The proceedings are not criminal in nature. If W is or threatens
to become a public charge, she can secure a support order for payments up to
$50 per week. This order is punishable for contempt. Laws of 1933, c. 482,
§ 137, provides that "*** an agreement to separate shall in no way preclude
the filing of a petition for the support of a wife who is likely to become a
public charge."
This court is a public policy court and, as such, merely reflects the method
with which the legislature chooses to cQpe with the pressing domestic relations
problems of today.
57 Cf. note 34, supra.
58 11 U. S. C. A. § 35 (1938).
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band need not reimburse the State. In all respects the couple
can begin over again. It would seem that H living separate
and apart should also be able to start fresh with a clean
slate.
At any event the agreement is not punishable by con-
tempt5 9
To summarize: Fraud, duress, coercion, overreaching,
weakness, nervousness, mistake, inadequacy as of the date
of execution, W's becoming or threatening to become a pub-
lic charge, lack of advice, and public policy against relieving
of support and against divorce all will enable a court to set
aside the contract.
E. Termination of a Separation Agreement
Judicially a separation agreement can only be termi-
nated by an action to set aside, and not on a motion.60 The
contract can not be modified by the court; it can only be set
aside in toto.6 1 In other words, the courts will not undertake
to redraft a contract for the parties. By mutual agreement
the parties can terminate their contract, in the same manner
as an ordinary contract is ended.62  Reconciliation of the
parties together with an intent to resume permanent cohabi-
tation will also result in a termination. 3 And once thus ter-
minated, the agreement will not revive when later the parties
re-separate. 64
An offer in good faith by one of the parties to resume co-
habitation will only result in a termination if on construc-
tion the court can say the agreement was temporary in na-
ture. If it was intended that the contract last for longer
than a temporary interval, an offer by one party to resume
cohabitation is unavailing in so far as termination is con-
59 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't
1930).
60 Note 35, supra.
61 Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N. Y. 13, 124 N. E. 91 (1919).6 2 See quotation from Randolph v. Field, p. 190, supra. If the contract is
under seal, it cannot be modified orally, by an unexecuted promise. Enthoven
v. Enthoven, 225 App. Div. 309, 232 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1st Dep't 1929).63 Brody v. Brody, 190 App. Div. 806, 180 N. Y. Supp. 364 (1st Dep't
1920).6 4 In re Landon's Estate, 149 Misc. 832, 269 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1933).
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cerned.6 5 The Restatement of Contracts, Section 584, adopts
the rule that in any case a bona fide offer by one party will
per se terminate the agreement. This latter view is desirable
since it is consonant with the settled policy against disrup-
tion of the marriage, and does not allow the contract to
stand in the way of cohabitation.
As to whether or not a separation agreement will survive
divorce or remarriage is a matter of construing the con-
tract.66 Generally, courts favor that construction which
make it terminate at the death of the husband, although the
agreement is capable of lasting till the wife's death.6 7
It is submitted that divorce should ipso facto terminate
the agreement. Divorce ends the marriage relationship, and
there is no need to foster-and scrutinize these contracts whose
purpose is to effectuate an amicable settlement extra curiam
of domestic differences. Once the quarrel is submitted to a
court, the private transactions of the parties should end.
Particularly should this be so in view of the broad provisions
of the statute in regard to the support of a wife or children
in case of divorce, separation, and more recently, annul-
ment.6 8 To allow a separation agreement to exist side by
side with an alimony decree is to have the anomalous situa-
tion wherein a court can modify the alimony but is powerless
to do the same with- the contract. The result is that under
the decree H is bound to pay an amount different than the
contract sum.69 Thus, in effect, the power of the court is
nullified, and the beneficial aspects of the broad statutes are
lost. Alimony is more effective and efficient than a contract
provision.70
The reasoning to support the rule that divorce ends a
65 Calkins v. Long, 22 Barb. 97 (N. Y. 1855) ; cf. 40 A. L. R. 1227.
68 Fleischman v. Ferguson, 223 N. Y. 235, 119 N. E. 400 (1916) ; Clay-
burgh v. Clayburgh, 218 App. Div. 411, 218 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1st Dep't 1926) ;
Westover v. Westover, 133 Misc. 510, 232 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1929) ; cf. Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Willis, 248 App. Div. 753, 288 N. Y. Supp. 773 (2d Dep't 1936).
67 In re Junge, 125 Misc. 707, 212 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1925) ; Brooklyn Trust
Co. v. Lester, note 30, supra; cf. also 100 A. L. R. 500.
68 C. P. A. §§ 1170, 1171, 1172.
69 Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296, 26 N. E. (2d) 265 (1940).
7 0 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't
1930) ; Winburn v. Winburn, 200 App. Div. 26, 192 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1st Dep't
1922).
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separation agreement is that one of the implied conditions
of every such contract is that it terminate on divorce.71
Any default in payments, or any breach of a substan-
tial nature, gives the other party an election.72  As in all
cases of election, mistake will prevent it from becoming
binding.73 The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract
is inapplicable to a separation agreement. 74
Since a divorce does not necessarily terminate the con-
tract, suing for divorce is neither a repudiation nor an elec-
tion.76 A separation agreement bars the institution of a
separation action. Thus suing for a separation is equal to
a suit to set aside the agreement, and is an election and a
repudiation.76 A request for permanent alimony where W
is under no mistake as to her rights, is equal to a repudiation
and an election.77 Although the same cases lump temporary
alimony with permanent alimony, it is submitted that since
temporary alimony is not an adjudication of any rights, but
merely a matter of discretion with the court to insure a fair
trial, it should not be a repudiation or an election. A re-
quest for counsel fees will not amount to a repudiation or
election if the separation agreement makes no provision for
them.7 8
It is submitted that suing for an annulment should not
work a rescission since such suit is not inconsistent with the
continued existence of the contract.79 In the case of annul-
ment there is the initial question of whether or not there is.
a contract at all. Since there is no marriage, the duty to
71Cf. (1913) 13 Cor. L. REv. 168; (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 60S.72 Henry v. Harrington, 193 N. Y. 218, 86 N. E. 29 (1908); Landes v.
Landes, 94 Misc. 486, 159 N. Y. Supp. 586, aff'd, 172 App. Div. 758, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 230 (1st Dep't 1916). ^
73 Benesch v. Benesch, 106 Misc. 395, 173 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1918).7 4 Bauchle v. Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dep't
1918).
75 Cf. Gray v. Gray, 149 Misc. 273, 267 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1932).
76 Obrien v. Obrien, 252 App. Div. 427, 299 N. Y. Supp. 511 (4th Dep't
1937); Lawsberg v. Lawsberg, 171 App. Div. 354, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1050 (3d
Dep't 1916).7 Randolph v. Field, note 26, supra; Newport v. Newport, 131 Misc. 851,
228 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1928) ; cf. Ozznore v. Ozmore, 179 Ga. 339, 175 S. E. 789
(1923).
78 Socktnan v. Sockman, 252 App. Div. 914, 300 N. Y. Supp. 187 (4th
Dep't 1937).79 Butler v. Butler, 206 App. Div. 214, 201 N. Y. Supp. 111 (2d Dep't
1923).
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support or the promise to live apart can not be the considera-
tion. However, there are other promises upon which the
contract can hang. For example, the promise to bring the
annulment action or the promise not to rely on alimony pro-
visions after the annulment action are good consideration. 0
Of course, if none of the above factors is present, then if for
example, H were validly married to another, a separation
agreement between H and another will fail because of an
absence of consideration. 81 Since an annulment decree re-
lates back to the date of the alleged marriage,82 it would
seem that suing for an annulment should amount to an elec-
tion or repudiation. If there exists other consideration, then
that will be a sufficient answer. If not, we may employ the
reasoning of former Chief Judge Cardozo,88 and say that the
relation back of decrees is a fiction which will never work
injustice by carrying with it an equitable separation contract.
Where H breaks the contract by failing to make the re-
quired payments, and W, exercising her election, rescinds
the agreement, W can nonetheless recover all payments due
under the contract up to the date of her effective rescission. 84
Where H is in default, W may waive her rights by sleep-
ing on them for an unreasonable length of time.8 5
THE EFFECT OF A SEPARATION AGREEMENT 8 6
A. Effect on the Duty to. Support
Normally a wife has three methods by which she can
enforce the duty to support: 1. She can pledge H's credit,
2. She can sue criminally or in the Domestic Relations Court,
80 Shaff v. Shaff, 175 Misc. 339, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 651 (1940).
s Abrams v. Abrams, 150 Misc. 660, 270 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1934).
82 Matter of Moncrief, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923).
8 3 American Surety Co. v. Connor, 251 N. Y. 1, 8, 166 N. E. 783 (1929);
Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 369, 167 N. E. 501 (1929).84 Breiterman v. Breiterman, 239 App. Div. 709, 268 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1st
Dep't 1934).85 Bartholomaus v. Bartholomaus, 259 App. Div. 1040, 20 N. Y. S. (2d)
945 (2d Dep't 1940); Ross v. Ross, 252 App. Div. 831, 299 N. Y. Supp. 325
(3d Dep't 1937).
8s The present discussion will emphasize the administrative aspect of sepa-
ration agreements. For a comprehensive study of the testamentary effect of
such agreements see (1934) 4 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 139.
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or 3. She can sue for a divorce or separation, and in such
suit obtain alimony.
What is the effect of a separation agreement upon the
above?
If H provides W with sufficient money to purchase neces-
saries, and with ready cash with which to make present pur-
chases, a tradesman who furnishes W with necessaries will
not be able to collect their value from H.8 7 If there is a
separation agreement between the parties then unless the
court hearing the tradesman's suit also has the wife before it,
and unless it has jurisdiction to set aside the agreement, the
tradesman is precluded. 88 If the court has jurisdiction to
set aside the agreement and the wife is also before the court,
the court will treat the suit as a joinder of an action to set
aside and an action for goods sold.8 9 Where the above two
conditions do not exist, H has a defense.
Where H has defaulted, repudiated, or in any way
broken the contract, the pledging of H's credit by WV should
be deemed such inconsistent action as to amount to a rescis-
sion. In order to preserve the agreement, W should only
be allowed to proceed upon the theory that the contract is
still in force, i.e.., sue upon the contract. Thus where H is
in default, the pledging of his credit should ipso facto ter-
minate the agreement, leaving H with no defense to the
tradesman's suit.
In a criminal court or in the Domestic Relations Court
a separation agreement is of no effect since these courts are
merely enforcing the public policy that as between the state
and the husband, the latter ought to bear the burden of sup-
porting an indigent wife °0
The effect of a separation agreement upon W's right to
bring suit for divorce or separation and in that suit obtain
alimony, is more complex.
A separation agreement will not preclude the institution
87Rochester Hospital v. Ingstrum, 171 Misc. 288, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 792(1939).88 Krieger v. Krieger, 162 Misc. 930, 296 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1937); ef.
Zysman v. Zysman, 140 Misc. 617, 251 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1931); Harding v.
Harding, note 25, supra.
89 Cases note 88, supra.
90 Note 56, supra.
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of a divorce action.9 1 An express provision in the contract
that the parties shall not sue for divorce, is void. 2 If the
agreement contains a clause that H will not molest W, the
institution of divorce proceedings is not a violation of such
clause. 3
In spite of early cases to the contrary, 94 it is law today
that a separation agreement will bar the institution of an
action for separation.95 This, however, does not mean very
much when we notice that a court can consider a separation
action as a joinder of an action to set aside the agreement
and the action for separation. 6 Nevertheless, if W's com-
plaint does not allege facts going to the validity of the sep-
aration agreement, then the agreement will bar the institu-
tion of separation proceedings.
If sufficient facts are alleged so that the court will treat
the action as a joinder of two actions, and if the court sets
the agreement aside, another problem arises. What was the
effect of the separation agreement upon the grounds for
separation?
During the existence of a separation agreement there
can be no abandonment. 97 The agreement should be treated
like condonation. That is, once the agreement is set aside
or rescinded, composed grounds should once again be avail-
able to W. 98  However, when the contract is set aside, W,
as a condition precedent to suit, must offer and allege her
willingness to cohabit with H.99  Such offer if accepted
amounts to a condonation; if not accepted, to a valid ground
for judicial separation. 100
91 Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677, 14 N. E. 500 (1887).
92 Galusba v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114 (1889).98 Hughes v. Cuming, 165 N. Y. 91, 58 N. E. 794 (1904).94 Landes v. Landes, 94 Misc. 486, 159 N. Y. Supp. 586, aff'd, 172 App.
Div. 758, 159 N. Y. Supp. 230 (lst Dep't 1916).95 Drane v. Drane, 207 App. Div. 217, 201 N. Y. Supp. 756 (1st Dep't
1923) ; Kamrath v. Kamrath, 231 App. Div. 533, 247 N. Y. Supp. 493 (3d Dep't
1931).
96 Cases note 88, supra. Observe also that where H has committtd such a
breach as to give W an election, the institution of a separation action is an
election to rescind. Note 76, supra.
17 Reischfield v. Reischfield, 100 Misc. 561, 166 N. Y. Supp. 898 (1917).98 Benesch v. Benesch, note 73, supra; Beebe v. Beebe, 174 App. Div. 408,
160 N. Y. Supp. 967 (2d Dep't 1916) ; Drane v. Drane, note 95, tp1ra.9 Reischfield v. Reischfield, note 97, smpra; Sturm v. Sturm, 80 Misc. 277,
141 N. Y. Supp. 61 (1912).100 The difficulties which encompass a court when the above reasoning is
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Since a separation agreement does not preclude the in-
stitution of divorce proceedings, does the separation agree-
ment condone adultery? Of course, if the agreement is set
aside, the adultery is available as a grounds for divorce. It
is submitted that a subsisting contract should condone prior
adultery for the parties consented to stay apart knowing of
the adultery. In this way the policy against divorce will be
satisfied, and the agreement will be serving a useful purpose
in keeping the case out of the courts. If the adultery occurs
after the agreement is executed, or if the adultery were not
known to the aggrieved party at the time of the execution,
then such adultery may be relied upon in a divorce action. 101
1. Effect Upon Alimony
An action to set aside a separation agreement is not a
matrimonial action, and so neither temporary alimony nor
counsel fees are allowable.102 In a divorce action, a valid
disregarded is illustrated by the case of Schelzel v. Schnelzel, 287 N. Y. 21,
38 N. E. (2d) 114 (1941).
In this case the separation agreement provided that if any support were
decreed by a court, the support provi-ions of the contract should be incorporated
in the decree. The wife subsequently brought an action for separation alleging
abandonment and cruelty. The court upheld the validity of the agreement but
proceeded to award a decree of support for the wife which incorporated the
support provisions of the contract. The court erred in not realizing that a valid
separation contract precludes the institution of a separation action and also
condones the grounds for the separation. Later the husband's income increased
and the wife applied to the court for an increase in her support provisions.
The Court of Appeals held that the contract was valid and, as such, binding
upon the court and preventing it from modifying the decree of support.
C. P. A. § 1170 expressly gives the court this power of modification and no
agreement of the parties can deprive the court of such power. This the court
overlooked. And so, by a combination of blunders and errors, there is enough
illogical reasoning on the books thoroughly to befuddle the courts, to say
nothing of the lawyers. The separation agreement involved did not oblige the
court hearing the separation action to entertain the suit. It contained no pro-
vision mentioning separation actions. And even if it did have such a provision,
the court should not have allowed the contract of the parties to bind them on
such a point. The extent of the confusion now introduced can be fairly welljudged by a reading of all the cases in notes 104, 105, 106, infra, in conjunction
with the Schmelzel case. In fine, Goldnuxn v. Goldman said that there were
two rights involved: contract rights and decree rights. Though the contract
rights could not be altered by the court, still the decree was always under its
absolute power. The Schmelzel case must be confra since it holds the contract
to be binding upon the decree.
lo Braunstein v. Braunstein, 257 App. 206, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 491 (1st
Dep't 1939); Hann v. DeFreest, 178 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1919).
'O2 Davis v. Davis, 195 App. Div. 430, 186 N. Y. Supp. 805 (3d Dep't
1921).
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separation agreement precludes the awarding of temporary
alimony or counsel fees.10 3 Since a separation action can
only be instituted if there is no valid agreement, this problem
does not there arise.
The cases say that a court can not award alimony in-
consistent with an unimpeached separation agreement even
though such agreement does not oust the court's jurisdiction
to award alimony.1 04  This limitation is meaningless when
we note that an alimony award may later be freely modified
even though it is based upon a valid separation agreement. 0 5
Even if the court forebears to award alimony, still, upon ap-
plication, the court may yet award it although it be different
than the contract sum.10 6
The result of the above is that a court can modify ali-
mony, but can not affect a separation agreement thus leaving
two inconsistent amounts which H must pay. 0 7 Alimony
may be enforced by sequestration, contempt, and the giving
of security and may be modified, while a contract sum is not
subject to these. 08  In a word, the separation agreement is
useless in view of the broad effect of alimony and the broad
powers over alimony which the court retains. The only sensi-
ble way out is to say that a divorce will in all cases terminate
a separation agreement. This leaves the court free to utilize
the broad powers which it was the legislative intent they
should exercise in such cases. It also does away with the
sloppy situation wherein a useless contract exists side-by-side
with an alimony award. 109
After alimony has been awarded, the cases are not clear
as to whether or not the parties can modify it by agreement.
Such an agreement is not a separation agreement, but is best
discussed here to complete the picture. Most cases hold that
a divorce decree may be modified by contract, while a separa-
103 Kamrath v. Kamrath, 231 App. Div. 533, 247 N. Y. Supp. 493 (3d
Dep't 1931). But see note 78, supra.
104 Galusha v. Galusha, 138 N. Y. 272, 33 N. E. 1062 (1893); (1930) 30
COL. L. REv. 1206.
105 Salmon v. Salmon, 261 N. Y. 646, 185 N. E. 775 (1933).
:'O Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1170; see Hamlin v. Hamlin, note 28, supra.
107 Bell v. Bell, 171 Misc. 605, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 500.
108 Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't
1930).
109 Cf. note 100, supra.
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tion decree can only be changed by a court order.110 There
are some cases which hold that even a separation decree may
be changed by contract if there is consideration for such
contract.1 1'
This conflict in the cases is not of great significance
since the modification is binding only as to executed per-
formances. That is, the modification affects only payments
actually made on past installments.12  As to future install-
ments the court still retains its broad powers which can not
be altered by any agreement between the parties. This is
true even though a party expressly waives his right to apply
to a court for a modification.113
A separation agreement gives W the status of a creditor
who can attack fraudulent conveyances, 114 and neither ali-
mony nor the sum due under a separation agreement is dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy."8 By virtue of a separation agree-
ment W can set up her own separate domicile, thus prevent-
ing H from setting up a new matrimonial domicile.'" This
last consideration is important when later H moves into
some different jurisdiction and there obtains a divorce with-
out an appearance by W.
A separation agreement has its definite place in the
law. And that place is all the more important in a juris-
diction such as New York which will grant divorces but for
one ground. Though separation decrees may be awarded
more liberally in New York, still a separation agreement has
certain definite advantages. A separation action involves
unfavorable publicity, besides entailing considerable expense.
And in the end the result is the same as under a separation
agreement because often the court permits the attorneys to
draw up the form of decree which he later signs. With either
110 Windle v. Heard, 254 App. Div. 875, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 977 (2d Dep't
1938).
111 Aldrich v. Aldrich, 220 App. Div. 555, 222 N. Y. Supp. 56, app. dism'd,
247 N. Y. 563, 161 N. E. 183 (1927).
112 Salmon v. Salmon, note 105, supra; 84 A. L. R. 299.
113 Miller v. Miller, 256 App. Div. 918, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 202 (1st Dep't
1938, 1939).
114 Enthoven v. Enthoven, 167 Misc. 686, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (1938).
":5 FED. B3ANKRUPTCY AcT, 52 STAT. 581 (1938), amended in 11 U. S. C. A.
§35 (1938).
116 Perrin v. Perrin, 140 Misc. 406, 250 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1931); cf.
Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273 (1901).
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an agreement or the separation decree neither party may
remarry.
There are cases where the parties are unable to come to
any amicable agreement, and they perforce must resort to
a court to untangle their differences. These are the unfor-
tunate cases. However, if the parties themselves are able
to make their own arrangements, the result will be much
more beneficial than if they are obliged to follow the dictates
of a solution imposed upon them. Also two attorneys are
usually able to work out some arrangement as well as and
sometimes better than a judge who is harassed by an over-
crowded calendar.
If the action of separation were abolished, the parties
would be forced to come to an agreement themselves without
court help. Necessity, as it is said, being the mother of in-
vention, I personally believe that good results, otherwise not
possible, would eventuate. Let it be remembered that if the
parties are of such a frame of mind that it is an absolute
impossibility for them to come to an agreement, then in
that case a court decree could not be of any help either.
From the other angle, much judicial time and patience would
be saved.
While everything which tends to impair a marriage
should be deprecated, still, since it is not feasible to force
two people to live together, the only practical treatment ip
to allow the two angry parties to make fair provisions for
their separation.
PAuL ROBE.RTS.
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